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1The soft power of popular cinema – the case of India
Daya Kishan Thussu
University of Westminster
Abstract
Among BRICS nations, India has the most developed and globalised film industry and 
the Indian Government as well as corporations are increasingly deploying the power of 
Bollywood in their international interactions. India’s soft power, arising from its cultural 
and civilizational influence outside its territorial boundaries, has a long history. Focusing 
on contemporary India’s thriving Hindi film industry, this article suggests that the 
globalization of the country’s popular cinema, aided by a large diaspora, has created 
possibilities of promoting India’s public diplomacy. It examines the global imprint of this 
cinema as an instrument of soft power.
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The notion of soft power, associated famously with the work of Harvard political scientist 
Joseph Nye, is defined by him simply as ‘the ability to attract people to our side without 
coercion’. The phrase was first used by Nye in an article published in 1990 in the journal 
Foreign Policy, where he contrasted this ‘co-optive power’, ‘which occurs when one 
country gets other countries to want what it wants’, to ‘the hard or command power of 
ordering others to do what it wants’ (Nye, 1990: 166). In his most widely cited book Soft 
Power, Nye suggested three key sources for a country’s soft power: ‘its culture (in 
2places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at 
home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and 
having moral authority)’ (Nye 2004a: 11). Despite Nye’s focus being primarily on the 
United States, and the vagueness associated with the concept of soft power, it has 
been enthusiastically adopted by countries around the world as an increasingly visible 
component of foreign policy strategy. It is a testimony to the formidable power of the US 
in the international arena that the phrase ‘soft power’ has acquired global currency and 
is routinely used in policy and academic literature as well as in elite journalism across 
the globe. 
The capacity of nations to make themselves attractive in a globalizing marketplace for 
ideas has become an important aspect of contemporary international relations, as has 
been the goal of communicating a favourable image of a country or countering negative 
portrayals in an era of digital global flows, involving both state and non-state actors and 
networks. In the past decade, many countries have set up ‘public diplomacy’ 
departments within their ministries of foreign affairs, while a number of governments 
have sought the services of public relations and lobbying firms to coordinate their 
‘nation-branding initiatives,’ aimed at attracting foreign investment and tourism 
(Aronczyk, 2013). 
As one of the world’s fastest growing economies and with a pluralist and secular polity, 
India is increasingly being viewed as a global economic and political power. On the 
basis of purchasing-power parity, in 2015 India was the world’s third largest economy, 
3behind the United States and China, despite being home to 40 per cent of the world’s 
poorest people (Drèze and Sen, 2013; IMF, 2014). Parallel to its rising economic power, 
is the growing global awareness and appreciation of India’s soft power—its mass 
media, celebratory religiosity (Yoga and Ayurveda) and popular culture (Tharoor, 2012; 
Hall, 2012; Thussu, 2013). It is important to note that India’s soft power has a 
civilizational dimension to it, the Indic civilization, dating back more than 5,000 years, 
being one of the major cultural formations in the world, from religion and philosophy, 
arts and architecture, to language and literature, trade and travel. India is the origin of 
four of the world’s religions—Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism and Sikhism—and as a 
place where every major faith, with the exception of Shintoism and Confucianism, has 
coexisted for millennia, India offers a unique and syncretized religious discourse (Sen, 
2005; Tharoor, 2012; Thussu, 2013). 
India’s global influence has a long and complex history. Its soft power in historical terms 
was directed not toward the West but to Asia. India’s cultural influence across East and 
Southeast Asia during the early centuries of the Christian era, was through the spread 
of Hinduism and Buddhism. The millennia-old relationship between India and the rest of 
Asia has a strong cultural and communication dimension. Buddhism was at the heart of 
this interaction, with the widest dissemination of ideas emanating from what constitutes 
India today, and remains a powerful link between the Indic and the Chinese civilizations 
(Liu, 1988; Sen, 2005). Narratives on Buddha’s life and teachings are still a cultural 
referent in much of Asia, while traces of Indic languages, cuisine, dance, and other art 
forms survive in parts of southeast Asia, notably in Indonesia. Buddhism is the state 
4religion in Thailand (where it arrived from India in second century AD) and a major 
influence in countries like Sri Lanka, Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia, Japan and China (home 
to the largest number of Buddhists in the world) (Liu, 1988).
Two of the world’s other great religions - Christianity and Islam - also have very long 
associations with India. Some of the earliest Christian communities were established in 
South India: St. Thomas is supposed to be buried in Chennai in southern India and one 
of the world’s oldest mosques is also located in India. Had British imperialism not 
partitioned India at independence in 1947, India would have become the world’s largest 
Muslim country in terms of population. Today India is home to the second largest 
Muslim population in the world after Indonesia, accounting for 11 per cent of the global 
total. This minority has contributed significantly to the millennia-old Indo-Islamic culture, 
notable for its classical music, poetry, and cuisine, and playing a key role in the 
development of Indian cinema. Such demographics also provide India with valuable 
cultural capital to promote its soft power among Islamic populations. 
Adding to this legacy is India’s long and continuing encounter with European modernity 
and its contribution to strategic autonomy epitomised by leaders like Mahatma Gandhi, 
the apostle of non-violence and tolerance – whose thoughts influenced such leaders as 
Martin Luther King and Nelson Mandela - and Jawaharlal Nehru, independent India’s 
first Prime Minister and an eloquent champion of non-alignment in international relations 
(Bayly, 2011). This rare combination of a civilization which has strong Hindu-Buddhist 
foundations, interactions with Chinese civilization and centuries of Islamic influence, and 
5integration with Western institutions and ideas, gives India cultural resources to deal 
with the diverse, globalized and complex realities of the twenty-first century.
From mobile telephony to online communication, India has witnessed a revolution in the 
production and distribution of its cultural products. Unlike in the West, the media are 
booming in India: newspaper circulation is rising (India is the world’s largest newspaper 
market); the country has more dedicated television news channels—400 in 2015—than 
the whole of Europe put together and it is also home to the world’s largest film industry. 
There is a steady growth in the visibility of cultural products from India— from Bollywood 
cinema to Bhangra music (Gera-Roy, 2010; Kohli-Khandekar, 2013; FICCI-KPMG, 
2015, Gehlawat, 2015). The digital revolution has ensured that these are now reaching 
all corners of the globe, largely through the increasingly vocal and visible 25-million 
strong Indian diaspora – the second largest after the Chinese and also the world’s 
biggest English-speaking diaspora - and this has contributed to India’s soft power 
(Thussu, 2013).
This change in India’s global status has coincided with the relative economic decline of 
the West, creating the opportunity for an emerging power such as India to participate in 
global governance structures hitherto dominated by the US-led Western alliance 
(Zakaria, 2008; Acharya, 2014). Given its history as the only major democracy which did 
not blindly follow the West during the Cold War years, pursuing a nonaligned foreign 
policy, India has the potential to take up a more significant leadership role. Despite its 
growing economic and strategic relations with Washington, it maintains close ties with 
6other major and emerging powers. India’s presence at the Group of 77 developing 
nations and at the G-20 leading economies of the world has been effective in 
articulating a Southern perspective on global affairs. 
India is also a key member of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), 
whose annual summits since 2009 are being increasingly noticed outside the five 
countries, which together account for 20 percent of the world’s GDP (Nordenstreng and 
Thussu, 2015). The United Nations Development Programme’s 2013 Human 
Development Report predicts that by 2020 the combined economic output of China, 
India and Brazil will surpass the aggregate production of the US, Britain, Canada, 
France, Germany and Italy. As the report, titled The Rise of the South, notes: ‘economic 
exchanges are expanding faster ‘horizontally’—on a South- South basis—than on the 
traditional North-South axis. People are sharing ideas and experiences through new 
communications channels and seeking greater accountability from governments and 
international institutions alike. The South as a whole is driving global economic growth 
and societal change for the first time in centuries’ (UNDP, 2013: 123).
Within this geo-political environment, there is growing recognition of the importance of 
soft power in a digitally connected and globalized communication environment, and in 
this the media play a key role. Despite the unprecedented growth of media and cultural 
industries in the BRICS nations, particularly in such countries as China, India and Brazil, 
the global media continue to be dominated by the US. Given its formidable political, 
economic, technological and military power, American or Americanized media are 
7available across the globe, in English or in dubbed or indigenized versions fuelling the 
$1.3 trillion global media and cultural industry, one of the fastest growing in the world, 
accounting for more than 7 per cent of global GDP. As in the twentieth century, the US 
remains today the largest exporter both of the world’s entertainment and information 
programmes and the software and hardware through which these are distributed across 
the increasingly digitized globe (Thussu, forthcoming). 
The sources of such ‘soft’ media power in the United States cannot be separated
from its hard power, as the world’s most powerful country in economic, political and 
military terms, expressed in its more than 1,000 military bases across the globe and an 
enormous defence budget (more than $600 billion in 2013, according to the London-
based International Institute for Strategic Studies), unmatched by any other nation. It is 
American hard power that impacts on many countries and helps legitimize the American 
way of life, promoted through its formidable soft power reserves – from Hollywood 
entertainment giants to the digital empires of the internet age. As Nye has remarked, 
US culture ‘from Hollywood to Harvard – has greater global reach than any other’ (Nye, 
2004b: 7).
One reason for the US domination of global media is that the country has always 
followed a commercial model for its media industry – a venture in which the successive 
US governments have been a crucial factor. Broadcasting in the United States – both 
radio and television – had a commercial remit from its very inception. Three main 
national networks – CBS, NBC and ABC– provided both mass entertainment and public 
8information. The entertainment element was strong in all three, with game-and-talent 
shows as well as glamour and celebrity programming becoming the staple diet 
(McChesney, 1999). In the post-Cold War world, the US-inspired commercial model of 
media has been globalized, a phenomenon that Hallin and Mancini have characterised 
as the ‘triumph of the liberal model’ (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 251).
The global growth of Indian media 
The rapid liberalization, deregulation and privatization of media and cultural industries 
have transformed broadcasting in India over the last two decades (Athique, 2012; Kohli-
Khandekar, 2013; FICCI-KPMG, 2015). The unprecedented expansion of television – 
from a single state channel in 1991 to over 800 channels in 2015, was paralleled by the 
growth of a new middle-class audience. At the same time the expansion of global digital 
media industries and distribution technologies ensured that Indian entertainment 
channels and films are increasingly visible in the global media sphere (Kaur and Sinha, 
2005; Iordanova et al, 2006; Kavoori and Punathambekar, 2008; Gera Roy, 2010; Gera 
Roy, 2012; Dudrah, 2012; Schaefer and Karan, 2013; Punathambekar, 2013; Gehlawat, 
2015).
With more than 400 round-the-clock news channels and a strong tradition of English-
language journalism, Indian perspectives on global affairs are accessible via such 
channels as News 18 India, TV Today and NDTV 24x7. All three are private networks, 
while the Indian state broadcaster Doordarshan remains one of the few major state 
news networks not available in important global markets at a time when global television 
9news in English has expanded to include inputs from countries where English is not 
widely used, including Qatar (Al-Jazeera English), China (CCTV News), Russia (RT), 
Japan (NHK World) and Iran (Press TV). The absence of Doordarshan in the global 
media sphere can be ascribed to bureaucratic apathy and inefficiency, though, in an 
age of what Philip Seib has called ‘real-time diplomacy,’ the need to take 
communication seriously has never been greater (Seib, 2012). Paradoxically, Indian 
journalism and news media in general are losing interest in the wider world at a time 
when Indian industry is increasingly globalizing and international engagement with India 
is growing from across the globe. For private news networks, the need for global 
expansion is limited, since, in market terms, news has a relatively small audience and 
therefore meagre advertising revenue. 
Belatedly, the Indian government has woken up to promoting its external broadcasting. 
A high-level committee recommended that Prasar Bharati, India’s public service 
broadcaster, should have a ‘global outreach’ (Prasar Bharati, 2014). Its vision is to: 
‘create a world-class broadcasting service benchmarked with the best in the world using 
next-generation opportunities, technologies, business models and strategies. The 
platform should be designed for new media first and then extended to conventional TV; 
[and to] outline an effective content strategy for Prasar Bharati’s global platforms (TV 
and Radio) focused on projecting the national view rather than the narrow official 
viewpoint’ (Prasar Bharati, 2014: 15).  
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While Indian television news may not yet have made any impact globally, the Hindi film 
industry, popularly known as Bollywood has emerged as one of the most notable 
examples of global entertainment emanating from outside the Western world (Kohli-
Khandekar, 2013; Punathambekar, 2013; FICCI-KPMG, 2015). It remains the prominent 
manifestation of Indian content in the global media sphere, and is today a $3.5 billion 
industry, which has helped to make the country an attractive investment destination. 
Watched by audiences in more than 70 countries, Bollywood is the world’s largest film 
factory in terms of production and viewership: every year a billion more people buy 
tickets for Indian movies than for Hollywood films. Though India has exported films to 
countries around the world since the 1930s, it is only since the 1990s and in the new 
millennium that Bollywood has become part of the ‘global popular’. The explosion in the 
number of television channels was a massive boost for the movie industry, not only with 
the emergence of many dedicated film-based pay-channels but also for its coverage of 
the film industry itself, given the huge demand of the new channels for content (Kohli-
Khandekar, 2013). 
According to industry estimates, the Indian entertainment and media industry was worth 
$29 billion in 2013 (FICCI-KPMG, 2015). In addition to exporting its own media 
products, India is increasingly a production base for Hollywood and other US media 
corporations, especially in areas such as animation and post-production services. 
These growing cultural links with the US-dominated transnational media corporations 
also facilitate the marketing and distribution of Indian content. As international 
investment increases in the media sector, with the relaxation of cross-media ownership 
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rules, new synergies are emerging between Hollywood and Bollywood and Indian media 
companies are investing in Hollywood productions. The changing geo-political equation 
in Asia, which has led to a closer economic and strategic relationship between 
Washington and New Delhi, has given a boost to this process. 
Shashi Tharoor, India’s former Minister for Higher Education and a pioneer proponent of 
its soft power discourse, has consistently argued that India has a ‘good story’ to tell and 
its popular culture is well-equipped to tell that story. To what extent has India’s popular 
culture contributed to its global presence and prestige? Has the greater volume of 
circulation of Indian cultural products through global digital superhighways changed 
external perceptions of India, enhancing its soft power? Indian industry and government 
have recognized and endorsed the potential power of culture at the highest level, as 
India’s then Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh observed in 2011, while addressing the 
annual gathering of Indian diaspora: ‘India’s soft power is an increasingly important 
element of our expanding global footprint […] The richness of India’s classical traditions 
and the colour and vibrancy of contemporary Indian culture are making waves around 
the world’ (quoted in Thussu, 2013: 128). 
Bollywood as Indian soft power?
The term Bollywood, coined in a journalistic column in India – and contested and 
commended in almost equal measure – refers to a major cultural industry which 
dominates all media in India, including television, radio, print, on-line content and 
advertising. Films also contribute to the massively popular music industry. For some, 
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the negative connotation of the word Bollywood is that it is a derivative, imitative and 
low-quality version of the world’s richest film factory – Hollywood – but in terms of the 
production of feature films and viewership, India leads the world: every year on average 
1,000 films are produced (apart from the Hindi- language cinema other major film 
industries within India include the Tamil, Telugu and Bengali – also catering to large 
diasporic constituencies). Bollywood, as the biggest and the richest, is seen both by 
government and industry as a soft power asset for India – one of the few non-Western 
countries to make its presence felt in the mainstream global cinema market. 
Cinema in India has a strong pedigree: within months of the invention of the motion 
picture by the Lumière brothers in France in 1895, films were being shown in Bombay, 
and film production in India started two years later. In 1913, the first full length Hindi 
feature film Raja Harishchandra, based on the life of a mythological king of ancient 
India, was released. In the silent era (1913-1931) more than 1,200 films were made in 
India and in 1931, India entered the sound era, and within a year, 28 full-length feature 
films in three languages were released (Barnouw and Krishnaswamy, 1980). Even 
before India became an independent nation, films from India were being exported to 
south-east Asian and African nations. One reason for the popularity of Indian films 
among other developing countries was their larger-than-life characters, escapist 
melodramatic narrative style, and song and dance sequences (Rajadhyaksha, 2009). 
The anti-colonial and progressive ideology which defined the formative years of Indian 
cinema was also attractive for governments in the communist world. The 1946 film 
Dharti Ke Lal (Children of the Earth) produced by the Indian People’s Theatre 
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Association, was the first film to receive widespread distribution in the Soviet Union. It 
has been suggested that one candidate for the title of the ‘most popular film of all times’ 
is Awaara (Vagabond, released in 1951), directed by Raj Kapoor, one of India’s most 
popular actors, as it was very successful in the Soviet Union and China, as well as in 
many other countries (Iordanova, et al. 2006). In Russia, Indian films continue to attract 
interest: the state-owned channel Domashny (Home) broadcasts Bollywood, while India 
TV, a corporation owned by the Moscow-based Red Media Group, has been showing 
Indian films and other programming in that country since 2006 (Rajagopalan, 2008). 
The deregulated and privatized global broadcasting environment and the availability of 
digital television and online delivery systems have ensured that Bollywood content is 
available to new and varied international audiences. Expansion, particularly into the 
lucrative US and European markets during the 1990s, was made possible by the 
availability of satellite platforms: Indian channels including Zee, Star and B4U 
(Bollywood for You) became available in Europe on Sky’s digital network, and in the US, 
on Echostar DISH system and DirecTV. With the growing convergence between 
television and the internet, these channels now have a global viewership (Rai, 2009; 
Dudrah, 2012; FICCI-KPMG, 2015).
In 2000, the Indian film industry was formally given the status of an industry by the 
Indian government, authorizing the Industrial Development Bank of India to provide 
loans to filmmakers, thus ensuring it could become a major source of revenue as well 
as an instrument for promoting India’s soft power. Such a move was also aimed at 
encouraging foreign investors to engage with the Indian entertainment industry. One 
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outcome of such official support was that investments began to flow from telecom, 
software and media sectors into an industry hitherto operating within an opaque 
financial system. The ensuing corporatization and the synergies this created made it 
possible for Bollywood content to be available on multiple platforms, satellite, cable, on-
line and mobile, resulting in a complex, globalized production, distribution and 
consumption practices including among the 35-million strong South Asian diaspora, 
scattered on all continents (FICCI-KPMG, 2015). 
From a soft power perspective, Bollywood is perhaps more effective among other 
countries of the global South (Tharoor, 2012). The Bollywood brand, co-opted by India’s 
corporate and governmental elite and celebrated by members of its diaspora, has come 
to define a creative and confident India. Gone are the days when diasporic communities 
felt embarrassed about the cinema of their country of origin, perceived by many in host 
nations as glitzy and kitschy. Today, Hindi films are released simultaneously across the 
globe, its stars are recognized faces in international advertising and entertainment 
(Punathambekar, 2013). There are many festivals and functions centred on Bollywood, 
and prestigious universities offer courses and research into this form of popular culture 
(Gehlawat, 2015). In 2008, Prime Minister Singh told Indian Foreign Service 
probationers, that the ‘soft power of India in some ways can be a very important 
instrument of foreign policy. Cultural relations, India’s film industry – Bollywood – I find 
wherever I go in Middle-East, in Africa – people talk about Indian films. So that is a new 
way of influencing the world about the growing importance of India. Soft power is 
equally important in the new world of diplomacy’ (quoted in Thussu, 2013: 134). 
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The primary market, though, remains the diasporic one, the UK/US segment of which 
has been revitalized in the past two decades. Given the importance of London as a 
global media centre, Bollywood has invested heavily to make its presence felt there: 
Britain accounts for a fifth of the global revenue for Bollywood’s international releases. 
Eros International, the world’s leading producer and distributor of Bollywood films, is 
headquartered in the British capital (Rai, 2009; Dudrah, 2012; Punathambekar, 2013). 
From a soft power perspective, it is not so much about the box office figures but the 
perception of India that its popular cinema creates among diverse foreign audiences 
and the attributes that appeal across cultures. In recent decades, a transnational 
attitude has been seen in terms of production values, themes and actors as well as 
investment in sub-titling in various languages to widen the reach of Indian films beyond 
the traditional diasporic constituency. Since 2002, Melbourne-based M. G. Distribution 
has been distributing Hindi films in mainstream cinemas, raising the profile and visibility 
of Bollywood in Australia, New Zealand and Fiji (Hassam and Paranjape, 2010). In 
south-east Asia, where the cultural and diasporic networks are a keen audience for 
Indian popular culture, many recent films were shot on location in the region. Networks 
such as Zee have country specific channels for Thailand and Indonesia. The promotion 
of family and community-oriented values in contrast to Western individualism, has made 
audiences in Muslim countries more receptive to Indian films. Given the large Indian 
diaspora in the Arab world, the region is a major overseas market for Bollywood: many 
blockbuster films hold their premiers in Dubai, a cosmopolitan city which is also setting 
up a Bollywood theme park. Until the 1980s, one third of all film exports from India were 
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for the diasporic and local populations in the Arab Gulf states. Even now, with the 
availability of a myriad entertainment programming from across the globe, Indian films 
continue to be popular in many Arab countries, as evident from the success of such 
channels as B4U Movies (Middle East). One indication that ‘Bollywoodized’ content is 
now specifically produced for Arab audiences, is the launch of Arabic channels by 
Indian media companies: Zee Aflam, Zee’s first dedicated movie channel – airing 
Bollywood films dubbed into Arabic – has been in operation since 2008 (Thussu, 2013).
Bollywood’s ‘charms’ have also been used to sell military hardware, as illustrated by the 
short video which leading Israeli weapon’s manufacturer, Rafael Advanced Defence 
Systems, produced in 2009 to coincide with the defence trade fair in India. The video 
with lyrics in English featured a Bollywood-style dance number, where Israeli actors in 
Indian costumes sing and dance around mock-ups of Rafael’s products, about Indo-
Israeli defence ties (Thussu, 2013). Geopolitics play a role in the reception of Bollywood 
in Pakistan too. Indian films were banned by the government there for nearly four 
decades, though smuggled counterfeit copies of VHS tapes and pirated DVDs were 
widely in circulation and Bollywood films were also accessible due to increasing 
availability of satellite television. Since the lifting of the ban in 2008, Bollywood films 
have become a rage in the country with which India has fought four wars and continues 
to have difficult relations. With its religiosity, gender representation and family-oriented 
scripts, the Bollywood version of ‘modernization’ seem to be more amenable to the 
Pakistani audience. Bollywood has traditionally demonstrated a strong secular streak, 
with some of its top stars belonging to India’s largest minority community. The 2015 
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heart-warming film Bajrangi Bhaijaan (Dear brother Bajrangi) starring one of the most 
popular stars, Salman Khan, about a mute little girl from Pakistan who is separated from 
her mother while visiting a Muslim shrine in India and how a traditional Hindu man, 
played with aplomb by Khan, takes her back to Pakistan to reunite with her family - did 
more than many diplomatic rounds of talks to improve people-to-people relations with 
Pakistan. In neighbouring Afghanistan, Indian films remain hugely popular. When the 
Indian foreign minister Jaswant Singh visited Kabul after the overthrow of the Taliban in 
2001, he reportedly carried with him Bollywood films and music tapes for his new 
Afghan hosts. US government cables released by WikiLeaks pointed to the potential 
role of Bollywood in promoting anti-extremism across the world, and peace in 
Afghanistan. A US cable from March 2007 said that high-profile Bollywood actors could 
play a key role in Afghanistan. ‘We understand Bollywood movies are wildly popular in 
Afghanistan, so willing Indian celebrities could be asked to travel to Afghanistan to help 
bring attention to social issues there,’ it said (quoted in Burke, 2010).
Northern Nigeria too has a long-established interest in Hindi cinema. The mushrooming 
of Hindi-to-Hausa video studios, where Indian films are routinely adapted or copied for 
the Nollywood market, indicates their value as cultural artefacts which can be reworked 
to suit local tastes and sensibilities (Larkin, 2003). The ‘visual affinities’ of dress, gender 
segregation, and the limited sexual content in Hindi films, are attributes which Nigerian 
audiences appreciate. In Indonesia, where Indian cultural and religious influence has a 
long history, Bollywood films and music are popular, influencing local music. Since the 
late 1990s, the Indonesian popular music form dangdut has borrowed and copied songs 
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from Bollywood films, setting Bollywood tunes to words in Indonesia’s official language 
Bhasha. Even in East Asia, in countries with their own large, sophisticated and 
commercialised film and entertainment industries, Indian popular culture has made 
inroads: in South Korea an internet-based service, TVing, broadcasts such Indian 
entertainment channels as Zee TV Asia, Zee Cinema, and the Bollywood music channel 
Zing.
Although Indian films were popular in communist China as a useful alternative to state 
propaganda and a cheap substitute for a Hollywood extravaganza, they had almost 
disappeared after China opened up to the West and rapidly developed its own film 
industry. A decade ago, this changed when a shortened, digitised and dubbed version 
of the Bollywood film Lagaan (Land tax) was released in China. The success in China of 
the 2009 campus-based comedy 3 Idiots, featuring another Bollywood superstar Aamir 
Khan, has brought Bollywood back into Chinese popular consciousness, especially 
among the younger generation. Though the film had made its mark through DVD sales, 
as well as on-line viewing, a version dubbed in Mandarin was released in 2011 in 
theatres across China. The Beijing-based correspondent of The Hindu newspaper 
reported the reaction of a senior Chinese official: ‘The film entirely changed mindsets, of 
even Ministers and entire Ministries. It mesmerised people and convinced them that 
there was a lot in common between both countries, and that Indian entertainment did 
have a market in China’ (Krishnan, 2012). Aamir Khan’s 2015 delightful comedy, PK, 
earned nearly $17 million at the Chinese box office, making it the most successful 
Indian film ever in China and among other overseas markets. More prints of this film 
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were released in China than in India. Leveraging Bollywood’s popularity in China, could 
be a useful soft power asset for New Delhi in its dealings with Beijing. 
Bollywood’s expansion into uncharted territories such as Latin America is an indication 
of the growing recognition of the soft power of Indian popular culture. A prominent 
example is the successful Brazilian soap opera Caminho das Índias (India - A Love 
Story), screened in prime-time on TV Globo, and winning the 2009 International Emmy 
Award for Best Telenovela. One of the most expensive productions in TV Globo’s 
history, it attained an audience share of 81 per cent for its last episode in Brazil, and 
was distributed to countries around the world, including South Korea, Indonesia, 
Australia, Russia and Portugal. The 206-episode soap was set in India and Brazil and 
dealt with Indian themes, including caste, gender and class, with Brazilian actors 
playing the Indian characters. The series used various cultural props from Bollywood, 
including the musical score. 
Synergies with Hollywood’s soft power
The growing visibility of Bollywood outside India has also been bolstered by the 
emerging synergies with Hollywood. Apart from the US, India is the only other major film 
market in the world where the majority of the box office is dominated by domestic films – 
more than 80 per cent in the case of India. Given the size of India’s market and its 
growing economic prowess, Hollywood producers are keen to forge business ties with 
India. The changed geo-political situation, with India becoming a close ally of the US – 
pursuing a neoliberal free-market economic agenda – has contributed to facilitating this 
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relationship (Ernst & Young, 2012; Punathambekar, 2013; FICCI-KPMG, 2015). Since 
Hollywood is arguably the world’s most effective instrument of soft power, having 
contributed significantly to winning the ideological battle against communism during the 
Cold War, this collaboration could provide Indian policy makers with useful lessons on 
how to successfully promote popular culture. 
Hollywood-Bollywood collaboration started in earnest in 2002 with the release of the 
action thriller Kaante (Thorns), the first mainstream Indian film to employ a Hollywood 
production crew, while Mangal Pandey: The Rising, became the first Indian-made movie 
to be released worldwide by 20th Century Fox. Since then, major US studios, notably 
Columbia Tristar (Sony Pictures), Warner Brothers, Disney Pictures and Fox, have 
started investing in Bollywood. One transnational player who has succeeded where 
others have failed is Rupert Murdoch with Fox Star Studios, benefiting also from the 
extensive presence of News Corporation-aligned companies in the Indian media 
sphere, notably STAR Plus TV. It also distributed My Name is Khan, a film almost 
entirely set in the US, which addresses a global audience about the issue of anti-Muslim 
discrimination as a result of 9/11– a sign of the maturing of mainstream Indian cinema. 
The film which was released in 64 countries and listed by Foreign Policy journal as one 
of the top ten 9/11-related films, provided an important alternative perspective to the 
wide-spread anti-Muslim prejudices in the West. On the other side of the coin, Indian 
companies have also started to invest in Hollywood. Reliance Entertainment, owned by 
Anil Ambani, one of India’s leading industrialists, in 2008 invested $500 million in 
Hollywood flagship Dreamworks, founded by Steven Spielberg, heralding a new era of 
21
partnerships. Their most prominent collaboration was the 2012 Oscar-winning film 
Lincoln. Indian directors are certainly capable of making films of ambition and for a 
global viewership: back in 1998, an Indian filmmaker, Shekhar Kapur directed Elizabeth, 
a quintessentially English film, while noted Bollywood director Vidhu Vinod Chopra 
wrote, co-produced and directed the 2015 Hollywood thriller Broken Horses. 
The Indian government could learn from the State Department about how it promotes 
the American cultural industries internationally. As a major information technology 
power, Indian government and corporations could deploy new digital delivery 
mechanisms to further strengthen the circulation of Indian entertainment and 
infotainment in a globalized media world. In the digitised globe, film entertainment in 
India is no longer just an artistic or creative enterprise but a global brand, contributing to 
the reimagining of India’s role on the international stage from that of a socialist-oriented 
voice of the Third World to a rapidly modernizing, market-driven democracy with global 
economic and cultural connections.
The power of the diaspora 
One key reason for the popularity of Indian cinema is the existence of India’s extensive 
and successful diaspora scattered around the world, their presence going back in some 
cases to 150 years (Amrith, 2011). This diaspora is also a critical resource for soft 
power dissemination, especially in the United States and Britain, where many Indians 
hold influential positions in boardrooms of transnational corporations, Ivy League 
universities and premium media organizations (Kapur, 2010). In 2013, Bobby Ghosh 
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was appointed the editor of Time International, the first non-American to achieve such 
an honour in the magazine’s 90-year history. Nitin Nohria became the tenth dean of the 
Harvard Business School in 2010—the first Asian to be elevated to such a position 
while Nobel laureate Sir Venkatraman Ramakrishnan was elected the President of 
Britain’s Royal Society in 2015. Satya Nadella, the CEO of Microsoft; Sundar Pichai, 
chief executive of Google and Shantanu Narayen, President and CEO of Adobe are 
other notable names. The Indian industrial group Tata owns the luxury brands British 
Jaguar and Land Rover, while the steel magnate, Lakshmi Mittal, an Indian, is one of 
the richest men in Britain.
These are, in the words of Nye, ‘soft power resources’ (Nye, 2004a: 6). India’s official 
public diplomacy infrastructure, though still in its early stages, has begun to engage 
foreign publics and, in collaboration with increasingly globalizing Indian industries, have 
been working to project India as an investment-friendly, pro-market democracy (Rana, 
2009; Hall, 2012). Communicating such an image has involved a public-private 
partnership to brand India using the power of Bollywood: to mark the 60 years of India’s 
independence, the Public Diplomacy Division of India’s External Affairs Ministry issued 
three videos on Bollywood, including Made in Bollywood; Bollywood: 60 Years of 
Romance and Hindi in Bollywood.
As India’s international profile has grown many members of its diaspora are attempting 
to reconnect with the emerging economic powerhouse (Tharoor, 2012). Among the 
policy elite in India, the diaspora is increasingly viewed as an important dimension of the 
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country’s soft power resources. Traditionally, the attitude of successive Indian 
governments toward the diaspora was of distance and disengagement, even when 
Indians abroad were threatened as in 1972, when thousands of Ugandan Indians were 
expelled by the military dictator Idi Amin. This attitude changed with the coming to 
power of the pro-business Bharatiya Janata Party government in 1998 which 
announced the creation of a Pravasi Bharatiya Diwas (Day of the Non-Resident Indian) 
celebrations, and the phrase ‘Vishwa Bharati’ (Global Indian) was coined (Government 
of India, 2002). Since then the day is celebrated annually on 9 January, symbolically 
chosen to mark the return of Gandhi to India from South Africa in 1914 to lead the 
Indian nationalist movement. The creation of the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs in 
2004, with its mission ‘to promote, nurture and sustain a mutually beneficial and 
symbiotic relationship between India and its diaspora’ was another milestone in this 
diasporic diplomacy (Government of India, 2012). 
However, mere possession of such resources does not make a country attractive on the 
world stage; these assets need to be translated into influencing the behaviour of other 
states and stakeholders, requiring a concerted effort by policy makers. Unlike China, 
India’s soft power initiatives are not centrally managed by the government. Indeed, the 
government takes a backseat while India’s creative and cultural industry, its religions 
and spirituality, as well as its active diaspora and businesses help promote Indian 
interests abroad, a phenomenon likely to accelerate in an increasingly globalized and 
networked world. As Tharoor notes, ‘India benefits from its traditional practices (from 
Ayurveda to Yoga, both accelerating in popularity across the globe) and the transformed 
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image of the country created by its thriving diaspora. Information technology has made 
its own contribution to India’s soft power’ (Tharoor, 2012: 284). 
How effective are India’s soft power initiatives? The intangible nature of soft power 
makes it hard, if not impossible, to measure. Has India’s civilizational communication 
with Asia given New Delhi a greater voice in the continent’s geopolitics? How does the 
popularity of Bollywood help the country’s foreign policy? Despite its widespread 
adoption in international relations literature and within media and policy discourses, the 
concept of soft power remains a fuzzy one. A very American concept, which emerged 
from the intellectual and cultural milieu of the world’s largest economy, and whose 
military power is infinitely superior to any of its competitors, US soft power has always 
been underpinned by formidable hard power. As Van Ham argues: ‘US’s hard and soft 
power are dialectically related: US interventionism requires the cloak of legitimacy 
(morally or under international law), and without it, coercion would provoke too much 
resistance and be both too costly and ultimately untenable; vice versa, soft power 
requires necessary resources and commitment to put words into action. Without hard 
power, attractiveness turns into shadowboxing, and at worst, political bimboism’ (Van 
Ham, 2005: 52).
To make India a more attractive country, especially among other developing nations, 
would require it to address the serious deprivation that millions of its citizens suffer on a 
daily basis. Despite its admirable economic performance in the past two decades, India 
is still home to more poor people than the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa. It is a country 
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where multiple and multi-layered forms of inequalities persist: India has the largest pool 
of employable youth in the world but it also has the planet’s highest incidence of child 
labour, despite it being banned in law. While dozens of Indians figure in the Forbes list 
of the world’s billionaires, India’s rank in the 2013 United Nations Human Development 
Index was at 136 out of 186 nations (UNDP, 2013). At a time when neoliberalism has 
created new globalized Bollywood films, nearly 300 million Indians live in abject poverty 
and deprivation. 
The exponents of India’s soft power have to consider why India’s example of a 
multicultural democracy has not been generally appreciated by other developing 
countries, who view the Chinese model of development as more worth emulating: on 
any measurable developmental index, China fares much better than its western 
neighbour, having considerably reduced if not yet eliminate poverty among its billion 
plus population, pulling up more than 400 million Chinese out of poverty in the last two 
decades, unprecedented in human history (Bardhan, 2010; Drèze and Sen, 2013). As 
Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen note: ‘even though India has significantly caught up with 
China in terms of GDP growth, its progress has been very much slower than China’s in 
indicators such as longevity, literacy, child undernourishment and maternal mortality’ 
(Drèze and Sen, 2013: 8). India continues to be perceived, accurately, as a country of 
extreme poverty, structural social inequalities, and cultural backwardness. As Tharoor 
notes: the benefits of economic growth ‘have not yet reached the third of our population 
still living below the poverty line. We must ensure they do, or our soft power will ring 
hollow, at home and abroad’ (Tharoor, 2012: 288).
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As the world becomes increasingly mobile, networked and digitized, will Indian cultural 
flows help provide an alternative discourse to counter US media hegemony or 
supplement it? In his 2011 book The Future of Power, Nye explored the nature and shift 
in global power structures – from state to non-state actors. In an age when ‘public 
diplomacy is done more by publics’, governments have to use ‘smart power’ (‘neither 
hard nor soft. It is both’), making use of formal and informal networks and drawing on 
‘cyber power’, an arena where the US has a huge advantage, being the country which 
invented the internet and remains at the forefront of governing it technologically, and 
dominating it both politically as well as economically. The Indian presence is also 
growing in cyberspace. In the last 15 years, India has seen an exceptional expansion in 
the internet, with an increase of 6,980 per cent. In 2000, only 5.5 million Indians (with a 
penetration rate of 0.5 per cent of the population) were on-line; by 2015 that figure had 
grown exponentially and there were 354 million internet users (and the penetration rate 
had crossed 28 per cent of the population), making them the world’s second largest 
internet users after China. In that year, India surpassed the United States to become the 
world’s biggest ‘open’ internet. Industry estimates suggest that by 2018 the number of 
internet users in India is expected to exceed 600 million, increasingly driven by wireless 
connections (Jeffrey and Doron, 2013; FICCI-KPMG, 2015). 
It is interesting to speculate what kind of content will be circulating on the World Wide 
Web, and in which language, when a much higher percentage of Indians get online. As 
their prosperity grows, a sizeable segment of young Indians will be going online, 
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increasingly producing, distributing and consuming digital media, especially using their 
skills in the English language, the vehicle for global communication. The Indian 
government’s $18 billion ‘Digital India’ initiative, launched in 2015 – with its slogan 
‘power to empower’, to bring internet access to people across the country, had 
enthusiastic support from both Indian and global conglomerates: $71 billion was 
earmarked by Indian conglomerates to provide the last-mile connectivity for electronic 
commerce and communication. This unfolding digital revolution, particularly significant 
in a country with strong ‘demographic dividend’ – India boasts the largest population of 
youth in the world - will ensure that Indic ideas, including Bollywoodized entertainment, 
will travel across global electronic superhighways in much vaster volume, and 
eventually, of greater value, strengthening the already well-established connection 
between India and its diaspora. 
However, beyond Bollywood what would make Indian soft power more effective globally 
would be for India to devise a developmental path which reduces, if not eliminates, its 
persistently pervasive poverty and inequality. While growing economic prowess has 
made some Indians rich and created a globalized Indian middle class, it has also 
contributed to increased inequality among the poorest, victims of economic and 
ecological excesses of neo-liberalism – both national and transnational (Kohli, 2012; 
Drèze and Sen, 2013). One area where an Indian contribution will be particularly 
valuable is development communication. India was the first country to use television for 
education through its 1970s SITE (Satellite Instructional Television Experiment) 
programme (Agrawal, 1977). It is well-equipped to deploy new digital media 
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technologies to promote sustainable development.  An Indian model of development 
within a democratic and pluralistic system - and in contrast to the Chinese one – would 
be worth emulating for many nations struggling with developmental models designed by 
the West. The Indian soft power resources in multilateral bureaucracies, the 
international nongovernmental sector, and communication and media fields can be 
harnessed to redefine a development discourse—one which is shaped in New Delhi 
rather than in New York.
References
Acharya, A., 2014. The End of American World Order. Cambridge: Polity.
Agrawal, B. (ed.) 1977. Satellite Instructional Television Experiment, social evaluation: 
impact on adults. Two volumes, Bangalore: Indian Space Research Organisation. 
Amrith, S., 2011. Migration and Diaspora in Modern Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Aronczyk, M., 2013. Branding the Nation: The Global Business of National Identity. New 
York: Oxford University Press.
Athique, A., 2012. Indian Media: Global Approaches. Cambridge: Polity.
29
Bardhan, P., 2010. Awakening Giants, Feet of Clay. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press.
Barnouw, E. and Krishnaswamy, S., 1980. Indian Film. Second edition, New York: 
Oxford University Press.
Bayly, C., 2011. Recovering Liberties: Indian Thought in the Age of Liberalism and 
Empire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Burke, J., 2010. WikiLeaks Cables: US Diplomats Suggested Bollywood Stars Should 
Tour Afghanistan, The Guardian, December 15.
Drèze, J. and Sen, A., 2013. An Uncertain Glory: India and its Contradictions. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press.
Dudrah, R., 2012. Bollywood Travels: Culture, Diaspora and Border Crossings in 
Popular Hindi Cinema. London: Routledge.
Ernst & Young, 2012. Film Industry in India: New Horizons. New Delhi: Ernst & Young.
FICCI-KPMG, 2015. Shooting for the Stars – FICCI-KPMG Indian Media and 
Entertainment Industry Report 2015. Mumbai: KPMG in association with Federation of 
Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry.
30
Gehlawat, A., 2015. Twenty-First Century Bollywood. London: Routledge.
Gera Roy, A., 2010. Bhangra Moves: From Ludhiana to London and Beyond. London: 
Ashgate.
Gera Roy, A. (ed.) 2012. The Magic of Bollywood: At Home and Abroad. New Delhi: 
Sage.
Government of India, 2002. Report of the High Level Committee on Indian Diaspora.  
Ministry of External Affairs. New Delhi: Indian Council of World Affairs. 
Government of India, 2012. Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, 2011–12 Annual 
Report. New Delhi: Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs.
Hall, I., 2012. India’s New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power and the Limits of Government 
Action, Asian Survey, 52(6): 1089–1110.
Hallin, D. and Mancini, P., 2004. Comparing Media Systems. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Hassam, A. and Paranjape, M. (eds.), 2010. Bollywood in Australia: Transnationalism 
and Cultural Production. Crawley, WA: UWA Publishing.
31
IMF, 2014. World Economic Outlook: Legacies, Clouds, Uncertainties. Washington: 
International Monetary Fund, October.
Iordanova, D. et al., 2006. Indian Cinema’s Global Reach: Historiography Through 
Testimonies, South Asian Popular Culture 4(2): 113-40.
Jeffrey, R. and Doron, A., 2013. The Great Indian Phone Book: How the Cheap Cell 
Phone Changes Business, Politics, and Daily Life. London: Hurst.
Kapur, D., 2010. Diaspora, Development, and Democracy: The Domestic Impact of 
International Migration from India. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Kaur, R. and Sinha, A. (eds.), 2005. Bollywood: Popular Indian Cinema through a 
Transnational Lens. New Delhi: Sage. 
Kavoori, A. and Punathambekar, A. (eds.), 2008. Global Bollywood. New York:  New 
York University Press.
Kohli, A., 2012. Poverty Amid Plenty in the New India. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
32
Kohli-Khandekar, V., 2013. The Indian Media Business. Fourth edition. New Delhi: 
Sage.
Krishnan, A., 2012. Zee TV Becomes First Indian Channel to Land in China, The Hindu, 
April 12.
Larkin, B., 2003. Itineraries of Indian Cinema: African Videos, Bollywood, and Global 
Media, pp. 170–192, in Ella Shohat and Robert Stam (eds.) Multiculturalism, 
Postcoloniality and Transnational Media. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
Liu, X., 1988. Ancient India and Ancient China: Trade and Religious Exchanges, AD1-
600. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
McChesney, R., 1999. Rich Media, Poor Democracy - Communication Politics in 
Dubious Times. Champaign, IL.: University of Illinois Press.
Nordenstreng, K. and Thussu, D. K. (eds.), 2015. Mapping BRICS Media. London: 
Routledge. 
Nye, J., 1990. Soft Power, Foreign Policy, 80: 153-170.
Nye, J., 2004a. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public 
Affairs.
33
Nye, J., 2004b. Power in the Global Information Age: From Realism to Globalization. 
London: Routledge.
Nye, J., 2011. The Future of Power. New York: Public Affairs.
Prasar Bharati, 2014. Report of the Expert Committee on Prasar Bharati. Vol. I and II, 
New Delhi: Government of India: Prasar Bharati.
Punathambekar, A., 2013. From Bombay to Bollywood: The Making of a Global Media 
Industry. New York: New York University Press.
Rai, A., 2009. Untimely Bollywood: Globalization and India’s New Media Assemblage. 
Durham: Duke University Press
Rajadhyaksha, A., 2009. Indian Cinema in the Time of Celluloid: From Bollywood to the 
Emergency. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Rajagopalan, S., 2008. Leave Disco Dancer Alone! Indian Cinema and Soviet Movie-
going After Stalin. New Delhi: Yoda Press.
Rana, K., 2009. India’s Diaspora Diplomacy, Hague Journal of Diplomacy 4(3): 361-72.
34
Schaefer, D. and Karan, K. (eds.), 2013. Bollywood and Globalization: The Global 
Power of Popular Hindi Cinema. London: Routledge.
Seib, P., 2012. Real-Time Diplomacy: Politics and Power in the Social Media Era. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Sen, A., 2005. The Argumentative Indian: Writings on Indian History, Culture and 
Identity. London: Allen Lane.
Tharoor, S., 2012. Pax Indica: India and the World of the Twenty-first Century. New 
Delhi: Penguin
Thussu, D. K., 2013. Communicating India’s Soft Power: Buddha to Bollywood. New 
York: Palgrave/Macmillan.
Thussu, D. K., Forthcoming. International Communication- Continuity and Change, third 
edition, New York: Bloomsbury Academic.
UNDP, 2013. Human Development Report 2013: The Rise of the South: Human 
Progress in a Diverse World. New York: United Nations Development Programme.
35
Van Ham, P., 2005. Power, Public Diplomacy, and the Pax Americana, pp. 47–66, in 
Jan Melissen (ed.) The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Zakaria, F., 2008. The Post-American World. London: Allen Lane.
Biographical note:
Daya Kishan Thussu is Professor of International Communication and Co-Director of 
India Media Centre at the University of Westminster in London. Author or editor of 18 
books, most recently, Mapping BRICS Media (co-edited with Kaarle Nordenstreng, 
Routledge, 2015); he is Managing Editor of the Sage journal Global Media and 
Communication.
Professor Daya Thussu
Communication and Media Research Institute
University of Westminster, Northwick Park, Harrow, HA1 3TP, United Kingdom
Email: D.K.Thussu@westminster.ac.uk 
